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The aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀect of technological oppor-
tunities and knowledge tacitness on inter-ﬁrm network formation, under two
diﬀerent industry regimes. In the ﬁrst regime environment is stable and the
aim of ﬁrms is to exploit knowledge. In this case, they attribute more value
to repeated interactions with geographically close ﬁrms. In the second regime,
there is environmental turbulence, which increases the value of access to novel
information from distant partners for exploration. The question addressed is,
under these regimes how do technological opportunities and knowledge tac-
itness inﬂuence structure of networks? The main contribution of the paper
diﬀerent from previous work is that it explicitly models the eﬀect of history
between two ﬁrms on networks that form. A simulation model is carried out
where ﬁrms select partners and learn from them, which further shapes their
selection process. The results reveal that in both regimes richer technolog-
ical opportunities and higher tacitness generates local and global star ﬁrms
depending on the parameter range.
1 Introduction
It is now acknowledged that networks have a signiﬁcant role in shaping economic
outcomes. In the economics literature, one of the areas in which network studies have
received recent attention is an inter-ﬁrm network, with the recognition that external
collaborations of a ﬁrm are a vital component underlying competitive advantage. The
position of a ﬁrm in a network has an eﬀect on ﬁrm performance (Mc Evily and Zaheer
1999; Ahuja 2000; Rowley et al. 2000; Hites and Hesterly 2001; Baum et al. 2000;
Baum et al. 2003) and it is also a resource for the ﬁrm (Gulati 1999). These imply
1that ﬁrms may select their partners as a strategic move to improve their network
positions (Baum et al. 2003). In addition to the importance of ﬁrm positions, the
overall structure of these networks have implications for the way knowledge is diﬀused
and thus eﬀects the innovative potential of an industry (Cowan et al. 2004; Cowan
and Jonard 2003).
In the literature, one of the controversies concerning how position of a ﬁrm re-
lates to its performance arose between social capital (Coleman 1988) versus structural
holes (Burt 1992) proponents. The former argues that, taking place in dense networks
composed of strong ties and embedded relations (Granovetter 1985) in which inter-
actions are frequent, face-to-face and accompanied with thick information exchange
is better for performance. As these scholars argue, networks rich in social capital
are associated with trust among the parties, so that concerns for reputation mitigate
possible opportunistic behavior. Also these networks facilitate transfer of tacit knowl-
edge since a common language is developed among parties, which increases eﬃciency
in terms of time and costs of negotiation (Uzzi 1997). On the other hand, too much
embeddedness can have counter eﬀects, like rendering the ﬁrm vulnerable to external
shocks or insulating it from novel information residing elsewhere in the network (Uzzi
1997).
Inspired from Granovetter’s leading arguments on the "strength of weak ties"
(Granovetter 1973), proponents of structural holes argue that networks rich in social
capital result in redundancy of information exchange, since the same parties interact
frequently and same information circles. As they argue, for increased performance
ﬁrms should ﬁll structural holes in the network, and act as “bridges” connecting oth-
erwise disconnected clusters of ﬁrms (Burt 1992). These weak ties are advantageous
in terms of getting access to novel information from diverse sources, thus beneﬁcial
for exploration purposes and when the knowledge being transferred is more codiﬁed
(Rowley et al. 2000). It is argued that especially in technologically turbulent envi-
ronments, a ﬁrms’ access to novel information is critical for competitive advantage.
Weak ties also have the beneﬁt of giving the ﬁrm ﬂexibility in adapting to new cir-
cumstances (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000; Uzzi 1997). One of the disadvantages of
ﬁlling structural holes is that the ﬂow of tacit knowledge is constrained, which can
2mitigate innovative performance, as observed in the case of chemicals (Ahuja 2000).
An apparent consensus concerning the debate between structural holes and social
capital views is that the type of network structure conducive to better performance
depends on characteristics of the industry and knowledge (Rowley et al. 2000; Burt
1998). Firms in turbulent environments may beneﬁt more from exploring knowl-
edge of distant ﬁrms, while ﬁrms in more stable environments can favour forming
strong links with close ﬁrms to deepen their existing knowledge (Rowley et al. 2000).
Empirical research in a variety of industries reveals that ﬁrm networks share some
fundamental commonalities in their structure at least in certain periods of the indus-
try life cycle. For example, research has shown that in the beginning of an industry’s
life cycle knowledge is less codiﬁed and technological opportunities are greater, and
these factors favor a highly clustered network structure which facilitates the ﬂow of
tacit knowledge (Cowan et al. 2004; Audretsch and Feldman 1996). According to
other research, ﬁrms networks are denser in periods of turbulence (Rosenkopf and
Tushman 1998). But the question remains that in the beginning of the industry life
cycle knowledge is tacit, yet there is also high levels of turbulance, which may favor
forming links with distant partners, and have weak ties in addition to strong ties.
In general this paper addresses these issues by looking at diﬀerent network struc-
tures that emerge under diﬀerent industrial environments, through an agent based
simulation study. In deﬁning the environment, we focus on tacitness of knowledge
and technological opportunities under two industry regimes; in one the environment
is stable, and in the other there is high technological turbulance. As diﬀerent from
previous work, we look at the eﬀect of history and geographical distance between
ﬁrms when they decide to form links. To summarize, the central question of this pa-
per is, if history of two ﬁrms and the distance between them matters for the beneﬁts
that a ﬁrm gains, how will the resulting networks look like under diﬀerent regimes of
the industry?
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we explain the model.
In the third section we present simulation results, followed by some discussions in
section four and ﬁnally concluding remarks.
32 The Model
The aim of the model is to highlight the characteristics of networks that emerge when
ﬁrms voluntarily select partners, under diﬀerent regimes of the industry. There are
two stages of this process; selection of partners and diﬀusion of knowledge.
2.1 Selection of Partners
In the ﬁrst stage of the model, ﬁrms select partners by assigning an expected value
to a potential partnership. This expected value depends on the industry regime and
the perceived level of the partner’s knowledge level. Mathematically, when ego ﬁrm i
is choosing among partners, he assigns the following value to a partnership with ﬁrm
j;





vij is the value of collaboration between ﬁrm i and j, kj is the knowledge level of
ﬁrm j, βij is to account for the error term that ﬁrm i might commit in forming its
expectation regarding the value of its collaboration with ﬁrm j, hij is the number
of times ﬁrm i and j has collaborated in the past, dij is the geographical distance
between ﬁrms i and j, and α is a parameter that we vary to control for the industry
regime. According to Eq. 1, the higher is the value of ﬁrm j’s knowledge, the more
value ﬁrm i places on their collaboration.
We distinguish between two industrial regimes as an exploitation regime and an
exploration regime as represented in Figure 1, which shows function s(.,.). The ver-
tical axis shows the perceived value of a collaboration for the ego ﬁrm, with potential
partner. Horizontal axis shows the status of the relationship between ego ﬁrm and
the partner, which is given by number of past meetings between ego ﬁrm i and ﬁrm
j, divided by distance between them.
4Values of α < 0 represent an exploitation regime in which knowledge is highly
tacit. In particular, for α < 0, as the number of past collaborations increase be-
tween ﬁrms i and j and as distance between them reduces, the perceived value of a
collaboration increases following a logistic curve. In this way, we capture not only
the importance of previous contacts but also the geographical distance. Because
knowledge is tacit, we model this relationship as a logistic curve, where the value
of collaboration with a speciﬁc partner as perceived by the ego ﬁrm ﬁrst increases
at an increasing rate, but after suﬃcient meetings, the marginal contribution of the
collaboration falls (i.e. the ﬁrms get to know each other suﬃciently well so that there
is less to be gained from each collaboration). Only when the marginal contribution of
collaboration is zero, ﬁrms achieve the full beneﬁts from collaboration. Two features
of this function are important for us:
(AS1) Shift of the curve to the right: As the absolute value of α gets smaller (rightward
shift of the curve) knowledge becomes more and more diﬃcult to transfer. In
other words, acquiring the same level of beneﬁt from a collaboration requires
more meetings and/or shorter distance.
(AS2) Change in the slope: As the absolute value of α gets smaller, the slope of the
curve decreases. In this way the function also captures an important eﬀect. As
knowledge becomes increasingly tacit, the marginal value of status falls. For
an ego ﬁrm, this means that there is very little diﬀerence in terms of expected
value, of connecting to an immediate neighbour, or else the one next to the
immediate neighbour, because in any case knowledge transfer is far too limited
in both cases.
How sensitive is the value of a collaboration to the number of previous interactions
and distance (i.e. the extent of tacitness of knowledge, α) is a parameter we vary
under this regime. In an exploitation regime, ﬁrms know that it is diﬃcult to transfer
knowledge, so they seek to build strong ties with close neighbours, and more compe-
tent ﬁrms are more attractive for a ﬁrm. Therefore, when a ﬁrm makes a decision to
select a partner, she values closer partners with whom she has met more in the past,
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Figure 1: Exploration and Exploitation Regimes
Values of α > 0 represent an exploration regime. Here environmental turbulence
is key; more distant and novel collaborations yield more value, expected value of a
collaboration falls as two partners repeatedly interact, because opportunity cost of
committing resources to the same partner increases. In this case, there is no additional
value to be derived from repeated interactions. On the contrary, novel partners
are what ﬁrms are looking for, to access novel sources of information and to gain
information about recent developments elsewhere in the network. In an exploration
regime, as value of α falls, knowledge becomes more tacit. In other words, it requires
more past meetings and/or closer distance to achieve a certain level of beneﬁt. To
summarize, the sign of alpha controls for the industry regime, while its magnitude
controls for the transferability of knowledge in both regimes.
2.1.1 Diﬀusion
In the second stage of the model, every ﬁrm selects a partner by choosing the one
to whom the ego ﬁrm has attributed the highest value, and collaborations form. We
assume that there are no costs of establishing links, and that forming a link does not
require the consent of the partner. In this way, in each period each ﬁrm collaborates
6with another ﬁrm (we assume that self collaborations yield zero value), which lasts
for one period. In this setting, a ﬁrm may have links with many other ﬁrms, if many
other ﬁrms prefer her. In this process, ﬁrms learn from their partners and knowledge
diﬀuses.
The extent of learning depends on the industry regime and also the range of
technological opportunities in the industry. Here it is assumed that when ﬁrms are
making their decisions, they have an estimation of the partner’s knowledge level (given
above in Eq. 1), but they are not farsighted enough to estimate what they can learn
from their partners, given the combination of their own knowledge and the partner’s
knowledge.
In an exploitation regime, the more two ﬁrms have met in the past and the
closer they are, the more they can learn from each other. On the other hand, in
an exploration regime, the less they have met in the past and the more distant they
are, the more they can learn from each other. In addition, industries with higher
technological opportunities yield more learning.
At the end of one period, ﬁrm i learns from the collaboration with ﬁrm j according
to
ki,t+1 = ki,t [1 + s(hijt,dijt)g(kit,kjt)] (2)
where we deﬁne g(·,·) as















where sij is as explained in Eq. 1. Eq. 2 tells that, the extent of learning depends
on a) history and distance and as revealed by function s(.,.) and b) technological
opportunities. Technological opportunities are measured by parameter γ. According
to function g(.,.) learning in a collaboration depends on relative knowledge levels
between ﬁrms i and j. In modelling increases in a ﬁrm’s knowledge as a result of
receipt of new information (See Cowan et al., 2004 for this type of learning function):
(AD1) the resultant knowledge level is continuous in the initial level of the ego ﬁrm;
7(AD2) if the ego ﬁrm knows more than the partner, the knowledge level of the ego ﬁrm
does not change
(AD3) when the ego ﬁrm’s knowledge level is small relative to that of the partner, the
increment to her knowledge decreases as she falls further behind;
(AD4) it is in general possible for an ego ﬁrm to leapfrog the partner, achieving a
higher knowledge level than the partner after the collaboration.
Parameter γ measures two aspects of learning: absorption and innovation. In
Figure 2 (a) and (b), the horizontal axis shows the relative knowledge levels of the
ego ﬁrm i and partner j before collaboration, and the vertical axis shows the relative
knowledge levels after collaboration. Here, the 45◦ line to the right of rij = 1 reveals
that it is only possible to learn from more advanced people. If ﬁrm i has more
knowledge than ﬁrm j, rij > 1 and ﬁrm i’s knowledge does not change. When
γ = 1, there is only absorption shown by the vertical lines. In Figure 2 (b), there is
both absorption and new knowledge creation (i.e. leapfrogging). When the relative
knowledge levels before collaboration are above the critical threshold rc (1 > rij > rc),
the less knowledgeable ﬁrm i increases his knowledge over and above that of ﬁrm j
in the next period. This area is revealed by the horizantal lines, where the new
relative knowledge levels are bigger than one. The horizontal lines show the areas of
innovation. As γ increases further, the possibilities for innovation increase. Therefore
in this model γ measures the potential of the industry to innovate (Cowan et al., 2004).
One of the distinguishing features of this model from previous work is that we take
into account not only technological opportunities, but also the history of a partnership
as a determinant of learning and networks. The history of a partnership is included
in Eq. 2 as function s(.,.) as explained in the selection process.
The reasoning behind the learning function Eq. 2 is as follows. Let us think of
an industry in which technological opportunities are very high. This implies that
when two ﬁrms meet, for γ > 1, the ﬁrm who knows less has even the chance to
leapfrog the partner as implied by function g(.,.). However, if it is an exploitation
regime where knowledge is highly tacit, its diﬀusion between two ﬁrms will be more
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Figure 2: Absorption and Innovation
absolute values of α). Therefore, tacitness is a factor which inhibits the ego ﬁrm
from fully utilizing technological opportunities, unless it has met with the partner
ﬁrm suﬃciently before. This is how the history of meetings matter. As implied
by function s(.,.) in Eq. 2 the more two ﬁrms have met in the past, the more
chances they will have to fully utilize technological opportunities by counterfeiting
the negative eﬀect of tacitness of knowledge transfer. When knowledge is relatively
more codiﬁed, these problems are of no concern. In this case history matters less for
utilization of technological opportunities since its transfer is relatively easier. This
function captures these aspects of the knowledge diﬀusion process. In short, it tells
that the more tacit knowledge is, the more important it is that two ﬁrms have met
more in the past (or be closer to each other geographically) to be able to capture a
certain amount of technological opportunities.
These eﬀects are shown in Fig. 3. The initial knowledge proportion is 0.9. Higher
technological opportunities (square markers) yield higher knowledge creation. But if
knowledge is highly tacit (ﬁlled squares) making the most of opportunities requires
more meetings in the past and/or shorter distance between partners. The same
is valid for low technological opportunities, which yield less chances for knowledge
creation (triangle markers).
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Figure 3: Relative Knowledge Levels under diﬀerent levels of Technological Oppor-
tunities and Tacitness
period, selection process is repeated. We look into the types of networks that emerge
and the distribution of knowledge among ﬁrms, in the parameter space deﬁned by
technological opportunities, type of regime (i.e. exploration or exploitation) and the
tacitness of knowledge.
3 Results
The population consists of N = 30 ﬁrms, who are located on a circle. Each ﬁrm i
is endowed with a knowledge scalar, ki assigned randomly (drawn from a uniform
distribution) at period t = 0; ki shows the level of ﬁrm i’s knowledge. Firms are
endowed with diﬀerent knowledge levels. The main parameters that we vary are α,
which measures a) the industry regime (α < 0 for exploitation regime and α > 0
for exploration regime), and b) tacitness of knowledge (higher values connote higher
tacitness) and γ which measures technological opportunities. In the simulations α ∈
[−2,2], β = 1 ± 0.1, γ ∈ [1,7]. We look at measures of network structure under the
parameter space deﬁned by α and γ. One simulation run consists of 1000 periods.
At the end of the 1000 runs, we record frequency matrices, showing the number of
10times ﬁrms have formed links. We run 10 simulations for each of the parameter
combinations, and the results correspond to the average of network measures.We
analyse the resulting networks using social network analysis tools. In particular, we
look at the degree of localization of links, reachability among ﬁrms and centrality of
the networks.
3.1 Spatial Strength
Firstly, we measure the extent to which ﬁrms in the network form strong ties. As we
use the term, strength of a tie has two dimensions; ﬁrstly it measures the extent to
which the tie is constructed with a geographically close ﬁrm, and second the number
of times the tie is repeated between two ﬁrms. For this purpose, the spatial strength
index measures the extent to which they interact frequently with close neighbours.







where dij is the distance between ﬁrms i and j, and fij is the number of times
i and j have collaborated. The average is taken over all ﬁrms in the population.
Higher values of the spatial strength index reﬂect the tendency in the population to
form strong ties with close ﬁrms. Lower values of the index reﬂect a tendency to form
weak ties with distant ﬁrms. Figure 4 shows this measure.
In an exploitation regime, ﬁrms learn more by forming strong ties with close neigh-
bours. Therefore, the absolute values of the spatial strength index is high compared
to the exploration regime, in which networks are more dense and ties more diversiﬁed.
In an exploitation regime, choosing a close neighbour and forming a link repeatedly
enables a ﬁrm to utilize more technological opportunities that he can get from this
partnership. But as knowledge tacitness increases, the spatial strength index falls.
Indeed, this result is a consequence of AS2. The results are further discussed below
in relation to other network measures.
An important aspect of the model is that forming a tie does not require the consent
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Figure 4: Spatial Strength Index
of the model permits cases in which some ﬁrms might be high in demand, which will
increase the centrality in the network.
3.2 Centrality




(N − 1)(N − 2)
where cmax is the degree of the ﬁrm with the highest connections, ci is the degrees
of actor i.The term in the denominator gives the maximum possible value of diﬀerence
among all actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Figure 5 shows that in both regimes, centrality increases with tacitness. At the
same time, in industries with higher technological opportunities, centrality of the net-
works are higher. In the exploitation regime, it was observed that when technological
opportunities are higher and knowledge more codiﬁed, there are local stars, which is
evident from high spatial strength accompanied by high centralization. As knowledge
becomes more tacit, these local stars are replaced by global stars, as evidenced by
even higher degree centrality of the networks. To see the extent to which the ﬁrms are
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Figure 5: Degree Centrality of the Networks
3.3 Reachability
Reachability of the network measures the extent to which two nodes are accessible
to each other directly or via intermediaries. 1 For higher technological opportunities
and codiﬁed knowledge, we mentioned above that there are local stars in the network.
In Figure 6 it is possible to see that in this range the reachability depends on techno-
logical opportunities. As technological opportunities rise, ﬁrms are more connected
to each other, accompanied by local stars (Figure 5), and strong ties (Figure 4). In
an exploration regime, it is an expected result that all ﬁrms are connected to each
other since networks are denser.
4 Discussion
4.1 Exploitation Regime
In an exploitation regime, ﬁrms can learn more from a partner the more they have
met before, and the less distance between them. Although this generates a magnet
eﬀect which attracts ﬁrms to repeat links with close neighbours, this magnet eﬀect
diminishes because of two reasons: increasing tacitness, and increase technological
opportunities. These are observed in Figure 4 where spatial strength index falls as
























Figure 6: Average Reachability among Network Members
technological opportunities and tacitness increase.
The loosening of local interactions when knowledge is more tacit might seem con-
tradictory to most empirical evidence, which reveals that tacitness of the knowledge
base increases clustering. However, this result is hardly surprising in this model,
because it is imposed by the functional form employed. This is a consequence of
AS2, which states that the diﬀerence between connecting to an immediate neigh-
bour, or else connecting to a ﬁrm in the vicinity is lower as tacitness increases. As
expected, this creates a loosening of the connections towards more distant partners,
which reduces strength of ties.
At the same time, it is observed that this localization is loosened when tech-
nological opportunities are higher. Moreover, an interesting eﬀect of technological
opportunities on network structure is that when knowledge is codiﬁed, higher tech-
nological opportunities generate "local stars", whereas as knowledge becomes more
tacit, higher technological opportunities generate "global" stars. This can be ex-
plained by the two forces operating in opposite directions as explained below.
When an ego ﬁrm is making a decision to select partners, he can take into account
the partner’s knowledge level, and also their history and distance (see Eq. 1). The
14network structure that emerges is a result of the eﬀect that dominates. If knowledge
eﬀect dominates, ﬁrms care less about their history and distance, but more about
the knowledge of the partner and we see loosening of localization. For example,
when knowledge of the potential partner is too high, he becomes too attractive to be
ignored for the ego ﬁrm, so instead of commitment to making strong ties with close
ﬁrms, he can select the star ﬁrm. If history eﬀect dominates, ﬁrms care more about
forming strong ties with close neighbours, regardless of their knowledge level. The
process works in the following way.
When knowledge is codiﬁed, it is obvious that the history eﬀect is more dominant
(by axiom AS2), so ﬁrms have a tendency to form strong ties with close partners.
Here, as technological opportunities increase ﬁrms have more chances to leapfrog the
knowledge of their partners, provided that their relative knowledge levels are close
(see Eq. 2). In this case, some lucky ﬁrms have neighbours whose knowledge levels
are close to themselves. These ﬁrms can easily leapfrog their partners, and they have
more chances to innovate. As this process takes place, they become more attractive
for the other ﬁrms in the vicinity. In other words, having a ﬁrm in the vicinity whose
knowledge becomes signiﬁcantly higher than others attracts other ﬁrms to the star
ﬁrm. For these peripheral ﬁrms, this is the case where the knowledge eﬀect starts
dominating the history eﬀect, because there is a ﬁrm in the vicinity whose knowledge
is too big to ignore. Because transfer of knowledge is easier when knowledge is
codiﬁed, the knowledge gap between peripheral ﬁrms and the star ﬁrm does not grow
too much. Therefore star ﬁrms always remain as the local stars, without being able to
extend their ﬁeld of attraction to all the network. This is why the centrality is higher
for higher technological opportunities in Figure 5, which also corresponds to the
region where spatial strength is high. In this way, the spatial strength because of less
tacit knowledge, and the loosening eﬀect because of higher technological opportunities
yield the emergence of local stars.
As knowledge becomes more and more tacit, axiom AS2 tells that spatial strength
will be lower in the network as explained above. In this case, the knowledge ef-
fect can dominate the history eﬀect. Therefore ﬁrms will have a tendency to prefer
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Figure 7: Diversity of knowledge levels (standard deviation of knowledge)
case knowledge is relatively more diﬃcult to transfer. Some lucky ﬁrms who have
neighbours with similar knowledge levels in the vicinity start innovating. This time,
however, because it is relatively diﬃcult to transfer knowledge, the gap between these
ﬁrms and peripheral ﬁrms keeps increasing and peripheral ﬁrms fall further behind
(see axiom AD3). This is how some ﬁrms become more and more attractive, and
extend their ﬁeld of attraction to other ﬁrms in the network, and eventually they
become "global" stars.
To conﬁrm these results, we also looked at the knowledge gap among ﬁrms, mea-
sured by the standard deviation of knowledge in the population. Figure 7 gives this
measure. As it can be seen, both technological opportunities and tacitness of knowl-
edge have the eﬀect of increasing the knowledge gap among ﬁrms.
4.2 Exploration Regime
In an exploration regime, ﬁrms want to meet new and distant ﬁrms to be informed
about knowledge residing elsewhere in the network other than in close vicinity. The
results reveal that in an exploration regime, the same rules hold as for the exploitation
regime. More speciﬁcally, higher technological opportunities and knowledge tacitness
16increase centrality (Figure 5). The main diﬀerence between the exploration and
exploitation regimes in terms of networks is that, in the former case networks are
denser, and thus spatial strength index is lower (Figure 4). Figure 6 shows that in
an exploration regime, all nodes are reachable from each other as a result.
To interpret these results, let us think of the two forces at work in partner selection;
knowledge of the partner and history of interactions. Contrary to the exploitation
case, here the dilemma that a ﬁrm faces is whether to connect weakly to a distant
ﬁrm and have access to novelty, or to connect to highly competent ﬁrms. Because
there are no increasing returns from repeated interactions, ﬁrms can now select both
options. This is why the spatial strength index is very low, and the reachability of
the network is 1 in an exploration regime. In short, the networks are very dense, as
expected.
One interesting result in this regime is that when technological opportunities are
high, network centrality is higher. There are some ﬁrms who beneﬁt from their distant
connections more than other ﬁrms because of relative knowledge levels. This gives
them more chances to innovate. In this way, they become more attractive to other
members of the network. When knowledge is codiﬁed, its transfer is easier, so overall
knowledge diﬀerences among the ﬁrms do not grow too much. As knowledge gets
more and more tacit, star ﬁrms strengthen their position in the network, because
their knowledge easily exceeds that of other ﬁrms. In other words, only these ﬁrms
can make use of technological opportunities in the industry while others are attracted
to them without being able to learn too much and by falling further behind (see axiom
AD3). In this way, higher tacitness and technological opportunities generate stars in
the industry as revealed by higher centrality measures in Figure 5.
5 Conclusion
In general, simulation models enable a wide range of experimentation possibilities
despite their abstractness. In this sense, this paper is not an exception. The sim-
ulation model in this paper reveals some interesting dynamics related to emerging
network structures under diﬀerent industry regimes. One important contribution of
this paper is that, it not only looks at the eﬀect of diﬀerent industry regimes, but
17also explicitly takes into account the eﬀect of history and distance between two ﬁrms
on learning and networks.
According to the results of the paper in a world where we can distinguish be-
tween two regimes as an exploitation regime and an exploration regime, diﬀerent
network structures emerge depending on technological opportunities and extent of
transferability of knowledge. In an exploitation regime, value of a collaboration and
learning increases as ﬁrms meet more with each other and with those who are close
to themselves. Here we assume that the environment is rather stable. On the other
hand, in an exploration regime, the environment is turbulent, so opportunity cost
of committing to a single close ﬁrm is higher, in terms of foregone access to novel
information residing elsewhere in the network. In this case, ﬁrms do not want to
interact repeatedly, rather they search for novel and distant partners.
In an exploitation regime, networks are composed more of strong ties, where ﬁrms
interact repeatedly with geographically close ﬁrms. In this regime, high technological
opportunities and tacitness result in the emergence of local and global stars in the
network respectively, who are more competent than other ﬁrms. Our results imply
that in an exploitation regime, ﬁrms who are similar to each other in terms of their
knowledge level should be in the same vicinity to capture the most of technological
opportunities. When knowledge is highly tacit, too much diversity in knowledge re-
duces the chances to capture technological opportunities, and increases the knowledge
gap among actors, producing local and global star ﬁrms.
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